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Words hurt!  Recent cyber bulling newsstories show that a word can be aspainful as a punch.1 Unfortunately, thelaw redresses those who suffer injury
from harmful speech through a series of innocuous
remedies, including financial remuneration or retribu-
tion through minimal criminal penalties.2 However, the
law does not criminally sanction those who intentionally
inflict verbal emotional harm to the same degree as
those who intentionally inflict physical harm.3 In other
words, the legislature and the
courts are have not yet ele-
vated an actor’s intentional
inflictions of verbal harm to
the same jurisprudential ech-
elon as intentional inflictions
of physical force.4
Consider the first fed-
eral cyber bullying case of
Ms. Lori Drew.5 Ms. Drew, a
forty-nine-year-old woman,
was charged for using a fake
“MySpace” account to tor-
ment a thirteen-year-old girl.6 The girl committed sui-
cide as a result of the hoax.7 Initially, Ms. Drew was
found guilty of three counts of unauthorized access to a
web site—misdemeanors that carry minimal punish-
ment.8 The verdict was subsequently overturned by a
federal judge.9 The conduct that Ms. Drew was charged
with was one that “millions of people” engaged in, and
the judge was reluctant to establish a precedent on which
any person may be convicted for a mere violation of
MySpace’s terms of service.10
Society does not impose criminal sanctions for
the intentional infliction of severe mental anguish; in-
stead, such acts are punished civilly as the intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED).  Interestingly,
IIED is the only intentional tort involving harm to a per-
son that does not share a criminal counterpart.11 Every
state has imposed criminal penalties for the intentional
torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment.12 It ap-
pears that the intentional infliction of emotional distress
is accorded a lesser punitive status than the choice to
threaten or use physical force against another.
The same elements are used to prove both IIED and the
criminal charges for assault, battery and false imprison-
ment.  IIED, like assault and false imprisonment, is
largely a mental anguish offense.13 A prima facie case
for IIED requires, among other elements, proof that the
plaintiff suffered severe emotional harm.14 Similarly, as-
sault and false imprisonment require proof that a victim
suffered a similar type of cognitive distress, such as a
fear of harm or loss of liberty.15 In contrast, battery re-
quires proof of physical harm.16
At first blush, one
might argue that IIED,
which is a harm of severe
emotional distress, does
not share the requirement
that the plaintiff suffered
some physical pain.  How-
ever, according to recent
biological and neurochem-
ical studies, one can expe-
rience physical pain in
response to a tone or a par-
ticular set of harsh words.17
If one accepts these findings as true, the physical harm
requirement of battery may be equally prevalent among
those who are subject to severe and outrageous conduct.
Given that IIED presents the same types of harm as the
criminalized intentional torts, society would be well-
served by assigning IIED the same criminal status.  
Some modern theorists may argue that, given the
current state of the law, it is unnecessary to criminalize
IIED.18 According to these scholars, tort law has effec-
tively absorbed the theories of retribution and deterrence
through the use of large civil sanctions.19 These sanc-
tions serve a utilitarian purpose by regulating human be-
havior and satisfying the need for vengeance.20 Others,
however, argue that tort law primarily “prices” harm,
whereas criminal law serves to prohibit socially harmful
behavior.21 Consequently, the assignment of monetary
penalties as both retributive and deterrent in nature will
never compensate for the larger threat to individual lib-
erty.22 According to those in the latter camp, in order to
safeguard against physical harm, it is important to instill
in society “a general fear which cannot be adequately
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remedied by compensation.”23 Therefore, an issue arises
as to the appropriateness of extending criminal sanctions
to a harm that the law already redresses.24
This article will explore the appropriateness of crim-
inalizing IIED.  Part I will discuss the historical context
of civil and criminal remedies and evaluate their modern
application to intentional acts.  Part II will explore the
limitations of IIED and analyze whether the harm
caused by IIED parallels the harm caused by intentional
criminalized torts.  Part III will evaluate the appropri-
ateness of criminalizing IIED.  The article will conclude
that, given recent neuroscientific findings, IIED should
be criminalized.
The common law distinction between modern
criminal law and tort law was predicated on the victim’s
desire for retribution.25 In the early common law, a vic-
tim could pursue justice for the same wrongful act either
through what is now considered tort law or through
criminal law.26 Forbidden actions were punishable by
the crown, as the King was said to have been wronged
by every impermissible act.27 In addition, individuals
could independently seek retribution from impermissi-
ble acts through the legal system, which was intended
to deter private physical retaliation.28 As such, whether
an action was brought in tort or in criminal law was
largely a function of the wronged parties’ preference.29
A.    Punishing Civil and Criminal Wrongs
The present distinctions between criminal and
tort law vary little from their early predecessors.  Crim-
inal wrongs harm society while civil wrongs harm indi-
viduals.30 Although, most jurisdictions have codified
criminal wrongs and enumerated specific punishments,
torts remain largely uncodified.31 Damages can be nom-
inal, compensatory, or punitive,32 and the assignment of
each is left to the complete discretion of a judge or jury.33
Tort damage awards seek to achieve three fun-
damental goals: (1) to make the victim whole or as near
to whole as possible;34 (2) to compensate the victim for
additional pain or suffering inflicted by the wrong;35 and
(3) to deter wrongdoers from engaging in the same con-
duct in the future.36 Thus, tort damages do not solely
serve to regulate human conduct, but rather to place the
injured party in the same position he or she was in be-
fore the wrong occurred. 
In contrast, criminal punishment serves to curtail
future undesirable conduct by reshaping societal
norms.37 In certain instances, criminal punishment may
result in the loss of liberty or finances.  The legislature
is largely responsible for determining the range of pun-
ishment that may be assigned for a specific criminal
act.38 As such, judges have a degree of discretion within
these ranges to determine the punishment that is war-
ranted in a given criminal case.39
During this process, a judge may consider sev-
eral theories of punishment, including retribution and
deterrence.  Retribution imposes punishment as a means
of societal revenge.40 Deterrence imposes individual
punishment as a disincentive to the individual and to
others from engaging in the same harmful conduct in
the future.41 These theories are designed to satiate a
community’s need for revenge and to assure conformity
to desirable social mores.
This judicial embrace of retribution and deter-
rence has blurred the line between criminal and tort law,
particularly within the area of damages awards.  In re-
cent years, tort law has incorporated the criminal theo-
ries of retribution and deterrence.42 Courts have been
more inclined to use tort awards to sanction undesirable
conduct and to help shape societal norms.  For example,
in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,43
the Supreme Court upheld the jury’s award of $19,000
in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive
damages for slander, reasoning that “a substantial [civil]
award was required in order to serve the goals of pun-
ishment and deterrence.”44 The Court’s rationale has
been recognized by scholars as a bourgeoning relation-
ship between civil and criminal law.45 John Coffee re-
cently noted that “the dominant development in
substantive federal criminal law over the last decade has
been the disappearance of any clearly definable line be-
tween civil and criminal law.”46
Thomas Koenig and Michael Rustad have ex-
plicitly recognized that the criminal law principles of
retribution and deterrence have been assimilated into
tort law, ultimately coining the term “crimtort.”47 Crim-
tort is generally used to advance the notion that civil
sanctions can serve to regulate corporate wrongdoers.48
Financial deterrence at the corporate level is of great
value since loss of monies can threaten the financial
health, or even existence, of a particular business en-
tity.49
Theorists have posited the existence of a retribu-
tive factor within the assignment of tort awards.50
George P. Fletcher’s notion of corrective justice supports
I.    Intentional Wrongs - 
the Crime/tort Distinction
this theory.  Under corrective justice theory, “wrongful
acts create an imbalance in the equilibrium established
under criteria of ‘the geometric proportionality’ of dis-
tributive justice.”51 The wrongdoer “creates a shift in
resources from victim to the injurer.”52 In turn, “the in-
jurer should be required to give half the imbalance as
payment to the victim” to restore the status quo.53 From
a purely economic perspective, corrective justice sug-
gests that the wronged party is responsible for making
the injured party whole.54 According to this definition,
it is hard to see how the use of a civil award—viewed
from a corrective justice perspective—provides any de-
terrent effect.  However, to the extent that a victim feels
satisfied that he or she is now whole again, corrective
justice has a large retributive aspect.55
Theorists’ evaluation of the use of punitive dam-
ages to support criminal theories of punishment has
played out in the courts, which, after the TXO Produc-
tions Corp. decision, have routinely assessed punitive
damages against defendants in civil cases as a means of
satiating a plaintiff’s need for retribution.56 In BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore,57 the Supreme Court “em-
phasized the constitutional need for punitive damages
awards to reflect (1) the ‘reprehensibility’ of the defen-
dant’s conduct, (2) a ‘reasonable relationship’ to the
harm the plaintiff (or related victim) suffered, and (3)
the presence (or absence) of ‘sanctions,’ e.g., criminal
penalties, that state law provided for comparable con-
duct.”58
The Court, however, has recently begun to halt
the use of damage assessments as a means to punish.
Although the Court has yet to use the Eight Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause to limit punitive awards,59 the
Court has announced a series of cases that, under the
Due Process Clause, curtail a state or individual’s right
to collect unreasonably huge punitive awards.  For ex-
ample, in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,60 the Court ruled
that due process principles require judicial review of
punitive damage awards.61 In BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, a 5-4 majority ruled that the Constitution
prohibits “grossly excessive punishment on a tortfea-
sor.”62 Most recently, in Philip Morris v. Williams,63 a
widow brought a suit against Philip Morris for negli-
gence and deceit on behalf of her dead husband, a heavy
cigarette smoker.64 The Court considered the appropri-
ateness of a large jury award and ruled in a 5-4 decision
that the Constitution’s Due Process Clause prohibits the
use of punitive damage awards to punish defendants for
harm inflicted on persons who are not parties to the
suit.65 Courts at the state level have rendered similar de-
cisions.  For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court
recently ruled that the Punitive Damages Act (“PDA”)
did not permit a jury to consider general deterrence to
others when awarding punitive damages.66
This limitation on punitive damage awards as a
means of retribution or deterrence tacitly acknowledges
that its place lies most firmly within the confines of
criminal rather than civil law.  Regardless of the use of
civil sanctions, a need remains for using criminal penal-
ties to achieve the societal goals of conformity.  Under
the theory that individuals are most likely to regulate
their behavior out of fear of humiliation or loss of lib-
erty, criminal sanctions are an appropriate means to as-
sure that individuals behave within the rules of society.  
Robert Nozick has posited that in order to safe-
guard against physical harm, society must maintain “a
general fear which cannot be adequately remedied by
compensation.”67 Nozick’s notion is primarily based on
the retributive model.68 According to Professor Nozick,
criminal punishment is deserved under certain instances,
if not demanded.69 Professor Nozick demonstrates this
theory through a formula; punishment deserved = r * H,
where H is the magnitude of the wrongness or harm, and
r is the degree of responsibility.70 Blameworthiness is a
function of the value of the wrong done by the agent (H)
and the degree of the agent’s responsibility for the
wrongdoing (r).71 The value of r may range from no re-
sponsibility (0), as when a criminal defendant is not
guilty by reason of insanity, to full responsibility (1), as
when the defendant intentionally committed the crime.72
Professor Nozick’s theory is particularly appli-
cable to intentional wrongs.  According to the theories
of corrective justice and crimtort, the redistribution of
wealth from the intentional wrongdoer to the victim can
arguably coerce the wrongdoer into behaving properly.73
However, what is absent from both theories is the stigma
that is attached to criminal punishment; Prof. Nozick’s
theory properly accounts for the coercive value of
stigma.  His formula indicates that the more responsible
the wrongdoer is, the greater the punishment deserved.74
To the extent that punishment is viewed on a sliding
scale—from probation to monetary obligations to a loss
of liberty—certainly the latter is the most compelling to
ensure social conformity.  Defendants who commit torts
must balance the financial penalty against the personal
value gained from committing the wrong.  In contrast,
criminal punishment stigmatizes the individual, thereby
imposing a larger punishment and a greater disincentive
to engaging in those particular acts.75
According to Professor Nozick, criminal punish-
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ment is “a communicative act transmitting to the wrong-
doer . . . how wrong his conduct was”;76 punishment will
communicate clearly to the community that such con-
duct is intolerable.77 The deterrent value served by an
individual’s fear of stigmatization is often appropriate
as it may serve as a “system for public communication
of values.”78
Like two branches from
the same trunk, the law has pro-
vided for criminal and civil relief
from intentional harms to the indi-
vidual.  The sanctions for both
criminal and civil wrongs are un-
derstandably blurred as similar
theories are often used to attribute
blame and assess compensation.
Huge tort awards continue to usurp
the role of retribution and deter-
rence, both of which were previ-
ously reserved for criminal
punishment.  However, while tort
law can effectively prohibit indi-
viduals from repeating particular
types of conduct, the non-codified
ad hoc nature of tort law does little
to accomplish the most important
role of communicating a system of shared values that
define the boundaries within which individuals should
live their lives.  Tort law sanctions cannot match the rep-
utation of criminal punishment as an effective means of
regulating behavior.  For this reason, society is well-
served by the existence of both criminal and civil defi-
nitions for the same intentional wrongs.
b.    the Criminalized torts: Assault, 
battery and False Imprisonment
William Prosser identified four “dignitary torts,”
which are intentional harms against the individual: as-
sault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.79 These wrongs all require
proof that the defendant chose to engage in the tortious
conduct and that, by engaging in such conduct, intended
or knew with substantial certainty that the conduct
would invade an individual’s right to quiet enjoyment.80
Three of these torts—assault, battery, and false impris-
onment—also exist in criminal law.81
Much has been written about the conduct or el-
emental act of intentional torts.82 Unlike criminal law,
the act itself is not merely an element of the tort.83 In-
stead, proof of the plaintiff’s injury is mandatory, and
as such, is a prerequisite to liability.84 The act must be a
voluntary act—one in which the actor chooses to en-
gage.85 An involuntary act—conduct engaged in while
one is otherwise unconscious—is not sufficient.86 Thus,
an individual who hits a child while driving a car due to
an epileptic fit does not commit a
conscious act87 whereas one who
makes a conscious choice to swing
a fist does.88
Perhaps the most confusing
aspect of this process is proving the
actor’s desire to engage in the con-
duct such that it subsequently
brings about the intended result, as
opposed to intending the result it-
self.  The Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides the best illustration
of the element act.  “[I]f the actor,
having pointed a pistol at another,
pulls the trigger, the act is the
pulling of the trigger and not the
impingement of the bullet upon the
other person.”89 If the act is to pull
the trigger, the intent would be the
actor’s desired goal that he or she
wishes to achieve by pulling that trigger.  According to
Prosser, intent in this context means 
(1) . . . a state of mind (2) about conse-
quences of an act (or omission) and not
about the act itself, and (3) it extends not
only to having in the mind a purpose (or
desire) to bring about given conse-
quences but also to having in mind a be-
lief (or knowledge) that given
consequences are substantially certain to
result from the act.90
In order to prove intent, the actor must show that the de-
fendant chose to commit a particular action, and in so
doing, intended or knew with substantial certainty that
such an action would bring about the undesired result.91
The actor who pulls the trigger for the desired purpose
of causing harm to a particular person is said to intend
such conduct.92 The actor who pulls the trigger for en-
joyment purposes only, but does so in a crowded area,
is also said to have intended such conduct for purposes
of proving intentional torts since the actor knew with
substantial certainty that such conduct would bring
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Tort law sanctions can-
not match the reputa-
tion of criminal
punishment as an ef-
fective means of regu-
lating behavior.  For
this reason, society is
well-served by the ex-
istence of both criminal
and civil definitions for
the same intentional
wrongs.
about the undesired wrong.93 This requirement of intent
is the prerequisite for all intentional torts.94
i.    The Intentional Tort of Assault
An actor is liable for tortious assault if “he acts
intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with
the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such contact, and (b) the other is
thereby put in such imminent apprehension.”95 In other
words, an assault is the threat of harmful or offensive
contact coupled with the present ability to commit a
harmful or offensive contact.  Assault occurs in the ab-
sence of contact; therefore, assault would be actionable
on the basis of a mental, rather than physical, type of
harm.96
Proof of assault merely requires some apprehen-
sion of fear on the part of the plaintiff; physical harm is
not an element of the tort.  The fear need not be extreme;
proof of fright or humiliation suffices to support a cause
of action.97 For example, standing within striking dis-
tance of another while shaking a stick is assault; shaking
that same stick with the same force behind the victim,
who is therefore unaware of such actions, is not. 
Even the most offensive and off-putting words,
alone, are never sufficient to support an assault claim,
regardless of the mental anguish the words may im-
pose.98 Thus, in Lay v. Kremer,99 the defendant, while
fighting over a parking spot, called a woman a “mother-
fucking nigger”* and a “bitch”; the trial court acquitted
the defendant under the premise that “mere words [did]
not constitute assault.”100 Assault actions are generally
successful, it seems, when there is proof that the plaintiff
suffered some degree of fear or mental anguish resulting
from his or her belief that the defendant had a present
capacity to inflict physical harm.101
ii.    The Intentional Tort of Battery 
Battery is an assault coupled with contact that is
harmful or offensive.102 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts has divided battery into two categories: one in
which harmful contact results, and another in which fen-
sive contact results.103 According to the Restatement, an
actor is liable for battery if:
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful
or offensive contact with the person of
the other or a third person or an immi-
nent apprehension of such a contact and
(b) a harmful contact with the other per-
son directly or indirectly results,104 or (c)
he acts intending to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with another or third
person or an imminent apprehension of
such a contact,105 and (d) an offensive
contact with the other person directly or
indirectly results.106
Battery requires proof of the exact same intent
as assault.107
The difference lies in the contact.  Assault occurs
in the absence of contact, whereas battery requires some
sort of contact in order to be actionable.108
Another relevant distinction exists between the
two wrongs.  In order for assault to be actionable, the
plaintiff must be aware of the threat.109 However, battery
requires no awareness on the part of the plaintiff.  Thus,
if a defendant raises a stick behind a plaintiff’s back and
the stick hits the plaintiff, even if the plaintiff did not re-
alize the stick was raised, the defendant’s conduct is ac-
tionable under battery.
Battery is not necessarily considered a crime of
mental anguish, primarily because the element of
harm—or at least contact—is required for the crime.110
Courts have, however, considered offensive contact ac-
tionable when the plaintiff suffered humiliation or em-
barrassment.111 This recovery for embarrassment has
extended the boundaries of battery to include emotional
injury, in addition to physical injury. 
iii.    The Intentional Tort of False Imprisonment.
False imprisonment, sometimes referred to as
false arrest, is the intentional deprivation of another’s
liberty.  According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
false imprisonment occurs when an actor intends to
“confine another within boundaries fixed by the actor,
and his act directly or indirectly results in such a con-
finement of the other, and the other is conscious of the
confinement or is harmed by it.”112
While common law cases permitted an action for
false imprisonment in instances where the plaintiff was
unaware of his confinement, the current formulation re-
quires proof that the plaintiff realize his liberty is re-
strained.113 Thus, false imprisonment, which is an
infringement on the plaintiff’s belief that he is not free
to exercise his will to move about—like assault—is a
wrong against mental anguish.114
The intent element of false imprisonment is very
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similar to that of assault and battery.115 In order to be re-
sponsible for false imprisonment, the defendant must
know that he is confining another or be substantially cer-
tain that his conduct will result in confinement.116 Men-
tal anguish is, in essence, the chief component of false
imprisonment.  Under the Restatement formulation, the
plaintiff is not required to suffer any type of physical
harm; rather, the defendant must only instill in the plain-
tiff a sense of loss of freedom to move about.117 There
must only be a sense of boundaries.  Such boundaries
may be “large or small, visible or tangible, or through
real, still conception only.”118 Thus, in Allen v. Frome,119
the court held that false imprisonment occurred in a city
in which the defendant felt unable to leave town.120 Sim-
ilarly, courts have found that one can be falsely impris-
oned in a car that moves about.121
C.    the Corresponding Crimes
Criminal law assigns blame to those who engage
in intentional conduct.  Like tort law, criminal convic-
tions require proof that the defendant chose to engage
in conduct and that, by engaging in that conduct, in-
tended or knew with substantial certainty that the con-
duct would result in a wrong against society.122 While
criminal law also assigns punishment to those who acted
recklessly or negligently,123 the law seems to reserve the
greatest punishment for those who engage in intention-
ally wrongful conduct.124
Much has been made of the intent levels in crim-
inal law.  Early on—and still in many jurisdictions—in-
tent was divided between specific and general intent.125
Courts define specific intent as an actual purpose or goal
to engage in a particular type of conduct or a deliberate
choice to ignore a certainty of harm.126 General intent
translates into a sense of risk-taking or carelessness on
the part of the defendant.127
The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) has created
four classifications of an actor’s mindset as a means to
better delineate between specific and general intent: pur-
poseful, knowing, reckless, and negligent.128 “Purpose-
ful” is defined as a conscious goal to engage in
particular conduct,129 while “knowing” requires proof
that the defendant was substantially certain that such a
result would occur from a particular type of conduct.130
The torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment re-
quire proof of intent similar to general intent in that the
actor is responsible if he or she intended the conduct or
knew with substantial certainty that such an outcom
would occur.131 The Restatement’s definition of intent
corresponds quite closely with the MPC’s definition of
purposeful and knowingly.  Thus, proof of the actor’s
awareness is virtually identical in each instance.
i.    The Crimes of Assault and Battery
Assault and battery—common law misde-
meanors—exist today as statutory crimes in all Ameri-
can jurisdictions.132 Although the two crimes are
generally said in one breath, it is important to note that
they are actually distinguishable and are divided in the
same way as their tort counterparts.133 Like the tort, the
crime of battery requires an injury or offensive touch-
ing,134 whereas assault requires no physical contact.135
a.    The Crime of Assault
Various statutory formulations of the crime of
assault exist.136 These statutes can be divided into two
general categories: assault as an intentional scaring or
assault as an attempted battery.137 Assault, as an inten-
tional scaring, is the true codification of civil assault.138
For this type of assault, one is criminally responsible
when he or she carries out some behavior that causes an
apprehension of immediate bodily harm with the intent
to cause such apprehension.139 Pointing a gun at another
individual is sufficient to establish common law as-
sault.140 Under this formulation, assault criminalizes the
imposition of mental fear or anguish. 
In some states, evidence of mental anguish can
support the personal injury requirement of assault141 and
can include evidence that the victim was upset during
or after the assault, needed subsequent psychological
treatment, was unable to conduct a normal life, feared
for the his or her safety, and maintained continuing feel-
ings of vulnerability.142
The MPC formulation of assault constitutes a
misdemeanor in three circumstances: where the actor at-
tempts to cause or purposely, knowingly, or recklessly
causes bodily injury; negligently causes bodily injury
with a deadly weapon; and attempts by physical menace
to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily harm.143
This third circumstance incorporates the civil notion of
assault into the criminal law, as had been done in a ma-
jority of jurisdictions at the time the MPC was drafted.144
b.    The Crime of Battery
Just as in tort law, the common law crime of bat-
tery requires harmful or offensive touching.145 Battery,
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like assault, requires proof of an act or an omission and
a mental state.146 Many jurisdictions allow for both in-
tentional and unintentional battery.147 Intentional battery
typically requires proof of purposeful conduct.148 For
example, one who—with intent to injure—acts or omits
to act when he has a duty to act, which is the legal cause
of an injury, is guilty of criminal battery.  
Battery is not a separate crime under the MPC,
which has synthesized the common law crimes of may-
hem, battery, and assault into a single offense.149 One
who attempts to cause serious bodily injury or one who
causes such injury purposely, knowingly, or recklessly,
and under circumstances manifesting an extreme indif-
ference to the value of human life is said to commit bat-
tery.150
The MPC codifies civil battery and calls it “ag-
gravated assault.”151 According to the MPC, a person is
guilty of aggravated assault if he
“attempts to cause serious bodily in-
jury to another, or causes such injury
purposely, knowingly or recklessly
under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of
human life.”152 The level of harm
necessary to show “serious bodily
injury” varies by jurisdiction, and
can range from “reddish marks
around the neck” from a potential
choking153 to extreme physical pain
and disfigurement.154
c.    The Crime of False Im-
prisonment
False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of
another’s liberty.155 At common law, the offense could
be committed by mere words.156 The gravamen of the
crime is that the victim believes he is unable to remove
himself from the control of the defendant.157 Mere words
are insufficient to constitute false imprisonment if the
person to whom they are spoken is not deprived of free-
dom of action.158
According to the Restatement, one who inten-
tionally causes severe emotional distress to another is
liable “(a) for such emotional distress, and (b) for bodily
harm resulting from it.”159 Stated another way, IIED oc-
curs when “[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous con-
duct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such emo-
tional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results
from it, for such bodily harm.”160 IIED sanctions those
whose conduct is so outrageous that it brings about men-
tal and/or physical pain and suffering.161 Additionally,
IIED is the only intentional tort that allows recovery
from one whose goal is limited to creating emotional
havoc.
The tort of IIED is relatively new, as compared
to the traditional common law torts of assault, battery
and false imprisonment, all of which date back to before
the Sixteenth Century.162 Wilkinson v. Downton,163 a late
nineteenth century case, presented the first instance
when a court allowed recovery for a woman, against
whom a mean-spirited practical joke
was played.  As a consequence of
the joke, the woman suffered “vio-
lent shock to her nervous system,
producing committing and other
more serious and permanent physi-
cal consequences entailing weeks of
suffering and incapacity . . . .”164
The court allowed the plaintiff to re-
cover for the harm she suffered as a
result of the defendant’s practical
joke.165
Almost 150 years after
Wilkinson, the tort of IIED appeared
in a 1948 supplement of the Restate-
ment of Torts.166 The California
Supreme Court first applied the Re-
statement’s definition four years later when it decided
the landmark case of State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v.
Siliznoff.167 Courts across the country followed Califor-
nia’s lead, and today every state has recognized the in-
dependent IIED tort and “adopted [the] Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 46 in some form.”168
Like assault, battery, and false imprisonment, an
individual is responsible for IIED if it is his intention to
inflict severe emotional distress or he knows with sub-
stantial certainty that severe emotional distress will arise
as a result of such conduct.169 Under the Restatement
approach, the defendant must not only intentionally
cause severe emotional distress, but such conduct must
also be deemed “extreme and outrageous.”170 The Re-
statements have never attempted to provide a definition
of “outrageous” conduct, stating rather that something
II.    the NoN-CrImINAlIzeD tort: INteNtIoNAl
INFlICtIoN oF emotIoNAl DIstress (IIeD)
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The tort of IIED is
relatively new, as
compared to the tra-
ditional common law
torts of assault, bat-
tery and false impris-
onment, all of which
date back to before
the sixteenth century. 
is outrageous if “the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would . . . lead [the person]
to exclaim, “Outrageous!”171 Scholars and courts, how-
ever, agree that liability for this tort is reserved for the
severest cases where the defendant’s conduct goes “be-
yond all possible bounds of decency . . . to be regarded
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized com-
munity.”172 “Liability. . . does not extend to mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or
other trivialities.”173 As a result, severe emotional dis-
tress can be found only when “the distress inflicted is
so severe that no reasonable person could be expected
to endure it.”174
The modern formulation of IIED permits a
plaintiff to recover for injuries resulting from a defen-
dant’s intentional use of extreme and outrageous con-
duct if that conduct results in mental anguish or physical
harm.  A logical formulation of the proposed crime
would be patterned after the 1948 Restatement of Torts.
Thus, an actor would be subject to criminal prosecution
if he purposely or knowingly caused emotional distress
through extreme and outrageous conduct thereby caus-
ing mental anguish or psychic injury.  The conduct must
be so extreme as to go “beyond all possible bounds of
decency,” and “the mental anguish suffered by plaintiff
[must be] serious and of a nature that no reasonable per-
son could be expected to endure it.”175
Like the criminalized torts of assault and false
imprisonment, the criminalized version of IIED would
penalize a defendant when a victim suffers emotional or
psychic damage as a consequence of the defendant’s in-
tentional conduct.  Criminalized IIED would also result
in the same type of physical harm that is required for
proof of the prima facie elements of the criminalized tort
of battery.  The commonality of the harm caused by a
different type of conduct supports criminal punishment
for IIED. 
Neuroscientific evidence supports the conclu-
sion that verbal assaults can manifest themselves in
physical pain.176 Thus, where one assaults another with
outrageous verbal comments, the plaintiff might ulti-
mately experience physical pain.  This intentional inflic-
tion of physical pain is the type of harm that society
seeks to punish through the crime of battery.  
Since IIED creates the same type of harm as so-
ciety has sought to redress through criminalization of
the other intentional torts, it would seem consistent to
criminalize IIED.  Criminalizing IIED would further the
retributive and deterrent goals of punishment, particu-
larly at a time when new technology communicates out-
rageous and even horrendous conduct for which there
seems no viable punishment in criminal law.  Society
will benefit from criminalizing the intentional use of ex-
treme and outrageous conduct.  Such conduct is rare, but
to the extent that it results in intolerable wrongs, it is
worthy of criminal punishment. 
A.    similarities between IIeD and the 
Criminalized Intentional torts
The proposed criminalization of IIED would re-
quire proof of the same type of intent as the other crim-
inalized intentional torts. 177 Like assault, battery, and
false imprisonment, the state can only seek punishment
for IIED, and a plaintiff can only recover for the IIED,
upon proof that the defendant intended to cause the
harm or was substantially certain that harm would result
from his conduct.178 But while the intent and the harm
are the same, the act of IIED, use of extreme and outra-
geous conduct, is distinct from the other criminalized
intentional torts.  
Once the conduct is proven, it is incumbent upon
the prosecution to prove that harm resulted from that
conduct.  Harm can be both mental and physical.  The
mental anguish that is punishable through the criminal-
ized torts of assault and false imprisonment is equally
present in intentional infliction of emotional distress.179
A tortfeasor is only responsible for IIED if his actions
were the proximate cause of a psychic injury.180 Prosser
calls both assault and false imprisonment crimes of
mental anguish.  It seems, then, that mental anguish,
which the law seeks to curb, is equally present in
IIED.181
The pain inflicted through IIED can result in the
type of harm criminalized in battery.  The crime of bat-
tery involves proof of direct physical harm.182 Harm can
include a gunshot wound,183 a kick upon another,184 or
something as slight as intentionally blowing smoke in
another’s face.185 When recovering for IIED, many ju-
risdictions require proof of severe physical manifesta-
tions of emotional harm.186 In doing so, the law
recognizes that extreme and outrageous conduct can in-
deed cause the type of harm that is recoverable through
the other criminalized torts. 
New scientific research supports the conclusion
that the extreme and outrageous verbal conduct meted
III.    A CAll to CrImINAlIze INteNtIoNAl
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out through verbal assaults can inflict the same type of
physical harm that is prohibited by criminal battery.
Neuroscientific studies show that verbal abuse can bring
about physical symptoms, which in turn cause physical
pain.187 Actual measurable neurochemical changes can
occur in the amygdala—the part of the brain that per-
forms a primary role in processing emotional reac-
tions—when an individual is verbally assaulted or
experiences some other type of emotional trauma.188 The
amygdala instantly responds by inducing a series of
physiologic reactions including rapid heart rate, palpi-
tations, sweating and increased blood flow to large mus-
cle groups.189 These physiological changes in the brain,
which occur congruently with emotional harm, become
a form of physical pain, from which the victim clearly
suffers.190
Studies demonstrating the relationship between
psychological and verbal abuse and disorders such as
depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) further support the conclusion that IIED can re-
sult in the type of physical harm which criminal law
seeks to curb by punishing for battery or aggravated as-
sault.  A person suffering from depression may also suf-
fer from “persistent aches or pains, headaches, cramps
or digestive problems . . .” according to the National In-
stitute of Mental Health.191 Exacerbating this disease
through a verbal assault can result in more severe phys-
ical symptoms that often accompany anxiety disorders
include “fatigue, headaches, muscle tension, muscle
aches, difficulty swallowing, trembling, twitching, irri-
tability, sweating, nausea, lightheadedness, having to go
to the bathroom frequently, feeling out of breath, and
hot flashes.”192
In other instances, while the outrageous conduct
of IIED might not immediately cause physical pain, spe-
cific studies confirm that, despite the non-physical na-
ture of verbal abuse, abuse from IIED can be as
damaging as physical harm.193 In 1990, Psychologists
Nicole M. Capezza and Ximena B. Arriaga conducted a
study, in which they found that seventy-two percent of
234 female victims of both physical and psychological
abuse indicated that they were more negatively im-
pacted by the psychological abuse than the physical
abuse.194 Regarding their findings, the authors stated,
“[t]he results obtained in the present study clearly indi-
cate that psychological [abuse] is, with some variations,
as detrimental to women’s mental health as is physical
violence.”195
The seemingly similar requirements of intent
and harm beg the question of why it would be necessary
to criminalize IIED.  The need for punishment lies in
the fact that the act element of IIED is markedly differ-
ent from assault, battery and false imprisonment; more
importantly, punishment for this type of act does not re-
ally exist in most jurisdictions.196
Assault and battery penalize the actor who in-
tends to cause direct physical harm.  Pointing a gun and
missing satisfies the act element of assault.  Pointing a
gun and hitting satisfies the act element of battery or ag-
gravated assault.  The act element of false imprisonment
is satisfied by the actor who voluntarily chooses to con-
fine another or to make one feel confined.  For example,
locking car doors and speeding can satisfy the act ele-
ment of false imprisonment.197
The act element of IIED requires proof of ex-
treme and outrageous conduct.  In Rissman v. Chertoff,
a transportation safety expert whose superiors constantly
screamed at him for being too thorough and “scolded
[him] for hours as if he were a terrorist in a poorly writ-
ten ‘B’ movie script” provided sufficient evidence to
prove IIED.198 With this fact pattern, the courts could
not find an actionable claim for assault, battery or even
false imprisonment.  Only if IIED were criminalized
could the TSA supervisors be punished for their behav-
ior.  
In Gomez v. Hug,199 a supervisor at a county fair-
grounds, upon seeing an employee enter his office, said
“[w]hat is that fucking spic doing in the office?” 200 “A
fucking Mexican greaser like you, that is all you are.
You are nothing but a Mexican greaser, nothing but a
pile of shit.”201 The badgering continued and, as a con-
sequence, the victim suffered mental anguish that re-
sulted in “serious medical problems” that precluded him
from working.202 Under these facts, a state would be un-
able to punish for assault.  It is long held that assault is
not actionable unless the victim is placed in imminent
apprehension of immediate bodily harm.  Here, the ver-
bal lashings and demeaning behavior does not give rise
to a fear of harm.  Battery would also not be actionable
since defendant did not touch or intend to touch the vic-
tim.  Nor would false imprisonment apply as there is no
evidence that the victim was unable to escape.  In this
scenario, the defendant could not be criminally pun-
ished.  If IIED were criminalized, however, the defen-
dant could be subjected to penalties, as a reasonable jury
might conclude that his conduct was extreme, outra-
geous and beyond the bounds of decency.  
b.    Advancing the Goals of Punishment
41Criminal Law Brief
Criminalizing IIED would advance the goals of
society’s interest in curbing harmful conduct.  By adopt-
ing the newest criminalized intentional tort, jurisdictions
would be sending a message that conduct which men-
tally infringes on others’ freedom from harm is intoler-
able.  Punishment would allow society to seek just
deserts from those who engage in acts that are outra-
geous by traditional standards.  Moreover, punishing
IIED would send a message to individuals and the gen-
eral population that such conduct is intolerable. 
i.    What to Punish
Applying the proposed criminal statute for IIED,
the perpetrators in Rissman and Hug could be subject to
criminal punishment.  In the first hypothetical, the su-
pervisor hurled racial epithets at the
employee to the point where the em-
ployee suffered physical and emo-
tional harm.203 A significant number
of states and federal courts have held
that racial epithets shouted by one in
a position of power over another are
evidence of extreme outrageous con-
duct.204 In Alcorn v. Anbro Engineer-
ing, Inc.,205 the Supreme Court of
California held that an employee had
sufficiently alleged IIED because his
supervisor shouted racial epithets and
fired him.206 The court found it sig-
nificant that the person harassing the
plaintiff was “standing in a position
or relation of authority over plaintiff.”207 In Shuman v.
American Home Assurance Co.,208 a federal district court
found that a defendant who “repeatedly made racial
slurs directed at Plaintiff based upon his Arab ancestry,
calling him names such as “Fucking Arab” and “Fuck-
ing Carpet Salesman,” which slurs “caused, and were
intended by  to cause, Plaintiff’s emotional distress”
committed IIED.209 Under this analysis, the defendant
in Hug used language outrageous enough to be action-
able. 
The plaintiff in Hug also presented evidence of
serious medical problems.  Many jurisdictions require
proof of a physical manifestation of emotional harm.210
Assuming there was significant medical evidence to
show a manifestation of physical harm,211 the state would
be able to prove IIED.
Criminalizing IIED would also permit punish-
ment in other instances, including verbal domestic abuse
or cyber bullying.  Criminalizing the use of spoken and
written words that cause severe damage to another
would fall within  society’s goal to provide citizens with
a reasonable expectation of quiet enjoyment and liberty.
Verbal abuse is not afforded the same treatment
under the criminal law as physical abuse.212 Many ju-
risdictions do not criminalize verbal abuse.  In those that
do, it is under the guise of harassment.213 Yet verbal
abuse is a serious assault on one’s personal well-being.214
Additionally, studies confirm that verbal abuse often
leads to physical abuse.215 Criminalizing verbal abuse
would serve to prevent the commission of a greater
crime.216
Jurisdictions criminalize a variety of acts as a
means to prevent that future harm.  Conspiracy, stalking,
and loitering are all inchoate crimes that allow police to
constitutionally intervene poten-
tially greater criminal activity.217
For instance, an agreement to com-
mit a criminal act, which is conspir-
acy, can be prosecuted on its own,
even if the agreed-upon, contem-
plated crime never comes to
fruition.218 When considering pun-
ishing verbal abuse, IIED could be
seen as a similar inchoate act, al-
lowing police intervention before
the verbal violence translates into
physical harm. 
Criminalizing IIED would also
provide meaningful punishment to
the crime of cyber stalking.  In Lori
Drew’s case, the defendant imparted words, that on their
face, were seemingly innocuous.  The defendant secured
a “My Space” page under a false name and then pre-
tended that she was a teenage boy with a crush on the
13 year-old girl. 219 The woman later sent spiteful mes-
sages to the girl, including one that said “the world
would be a better place without you.”220 A reasonable
jury could find under the circumstances that Ms. Drew’s
conduct went beyond the bounds of decency.  In fact,
new accounts report that the jury wanted to convict Ms.
Drew of felonies that would allow punishment of up to
twenty years in prison.221 However, the available laws
did not support their desired goal.222
While internet communication is not criminal-
ized under IIED, internet communication can lead to a
claim for a criminal case of harassment.  For example,
in the instance where a woman posted a call for sexually
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the Suffolk County New York police filed charges of ha-
rassment against the woman.223 Under New York state
law, “[a] person is guilty of aggravated harassment in
the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy,
threaten or alarm another person, he or she . . . (b) causes
a communication to be initiated by mechanical or elec-
tronic means or otherwise with a person, anonymously
or otherwise, by telephone, by telegraph, or by mail, or
by transmitting or delivering any other form of written
communication, in a manner likely to cause annoy-
ance....”224 Here, the woman could be successfully pros-
ecuted for harassment since she initiated phone calls
likely to cause annoyance.  The maximum punishment
for this crime is up to one year in prison. 225 However,
the permissible penalty should be more severe.
The type of harm caused in this instance, assum-
ing that the harm resulted in severe mental harm, would
be more on par with New York’s second degree assault
statute, which criminalizes conduct when a person in-
tends to and actually  causes serious physical injury and
causes such injury.  Second degree assault is punishable
as a class D Felony, for a term not to exceed seven
years.226 Thus, even though the mental anguish caused
by the harassing phone calls could be the equivalent to
physical harm, New York’s second degree assault statute
would not allow for such conduct to be prosecuted as a
second degree assault.  Absent criminalization of IIED,
the offender in this case would only be sentenced to a
maximum of one year in prison, no matter how severe
the mental harm. 
Criminalizing IIED would provide a means to
impose a similar punishment in this similarly harmful
situation.  If the harassing phone calls caused the neigh-
bor to suffer from either emotional trauma or a physical
manifestation of that trauma on a level as contemplated
by second degree assault, then the offender could be
prosecuted under a scheme of criminal IIED.  Punishing
this kind of intentional conduct to the same degree as-
second degree assault for intentional conduct that in-
flicts a similar type of harm, would serve to further the
principles of our criminal justice system by communi-
cating that this type of conduct is so intolerable that it
carries with it a threat of significant punishment.
ii.   Why Punish
Given that IIED causes the same type of harm
as assault, battery, and the other intentional torts, the
issue becomes whether criminalizing IIED would fur-
ther the principles of punishment that drive the Ameri-
can criminal justice system.  Two theories largely gov-
ern the reasons for assessing punishment: retribution and
deterrence.227 Criminalizing IIED would advance each
of these theories.
a.    Retribution
Application of Professor Nozick’s equation for
evaluating the instances appropriate for retribution sup-
ports the criminalization of IIED.  As previously noted,
criminal punishment deserved = r x H, where H is the
magnitude of the wrongness or harm and r is the degree
of responsibility.228 The high magnitude of harm and the
defendant’s responsibility in the intentional outrageous
conduct of IIED highlight the well-deserved need for
retribution against such conduct. 
The r is this equation is easily satisfied.  People
are responsible for IIED only if they intend to commit
the outrageous conduct that causes harm or they know
with substantial certainty that such conduct will cause
another to suffer from IIED.229 This intent translates into
a conscious or willful desire to bring about a harmful
result.230 That they chose to engage in such conduct re-
flects the high level of responsibility on their part.
The law tends to increase the severity of punish-
ment based on a defendant’s willfulness.231 Homicides
illustrate this point most clearly.  One who intends to
kill by design is guilty of murder, a crime punishable by
life in prison or even death.232 Thus, an individual who
aims his car at someone standing on the street with an
intention of killing that person is said to be the most re-
sponsible and therefore the most deserving of punish-
ment.  Similarly, one who speeds through a crowded
school zone at three o’clock in the afternoon is also, in
many jurisdictions, responsible for the and deserving of
the charge’s maximum punishment for the death of an-
other.233 Although this person had no intent of killing a
particular person, he knew with substantial certainty that
he would likely kill someone as a result of his conduct.234
In contrast, one who speeds through a school zone at
three o’clock in the morning is likely to be held only re-
sponsible for manslaughter or reckless homicide.235 In
this instance, the individual is said to have only been
aware of a slight risk that someone could die as a result
of his conduct.  Because he only engaged in a risk, so-
ciety is willing to mete out less punishment.236 In most
jurisdictions, manslaughter is punishable by five to fif-
teen years in prison.237
IIED also imposes the same type of harm as the
other intentional torts, thus the H in Nozick’s equation
is as compelling for IIED as it is in other tort-based
crimes.  Particularly, IIED shares the sense of mental
anguish that assault and false imprisonment criminal-
ize.238 As noted above, psychological or verbal abuse
can be as damaging as any physical type of harm.239 De-
velopments in neuroscience indicate a strong link be-
tween verbal assault and emotional harm.240 This high
degree of provable physical harm meets the H prong of
Nozick’s formula.  Therefore, the high magnitude of
harm to the victim and the strong degree of responsibil-
ity on the part of the defendant compel criminalization
of IIED. 
Nozick’s theory is ideal for cyber-stalkers.  In-
dividuals who write directed e-mails or set up false ac-
counts do so with the highest level of intention.  The
harm cyber-stalkers cause can go far beyond annoyance
and may rise to the level of death.  Under Nozick’s the-
ory, such conduct is most suitable for punishment be-
cause H, or harm, is at its greatest.
b.    Deterrence
Criminalizing IIED is equally supported by the
theory of deterrence.  Deterrence advocates that an in-
dividual be punished as an example either to himself or
to others because the individual’s conduct cannot be tol-
erated.  Ms. Drew intentionally caused a child to suffer
by creating a fake internet “friend” to lure the girl in and
then trick her, acting in a way that society should dis-
courage. Her actions caused horrible public outcry, in
part because of the unnecessary and irreversible conse-
quences of her actions and in part because there were
few criminal laws under which she could be punished.242
To the extent that one assumes that deterrence works to
encourage members to conform to society’s laws,243 pun-
ishing this woman at the criminal level could deter oth-
ers from committing similar harmful acts.  
Criminalizing IIED as an inchoate crime would
serve the same deterrent value as assault.  As noted
above, the law criminalizes many inchoate crimes as a
means of preventing more serious crimes that could re-
sult from an individual’s conduct.  The MPC’s formula-
tion of assault and battery is an example of the use of
criminalization as prevention.  The law permits the pun-
ishment of those who attempt to cause the physical in-
jury required for proof of battery by criminalizing an
attempted batterer (for example, assault).244 Those who
subscribe to the theory of crimtort, and even many who
do not, might argue that over-criminalization already ex-
ists and that there is no need to create new crimes.
Crimtort has merit, particularly as it applies to a defen-
dant  corporation, where one is unable to single out an
individual for punishment.  However, a loss of liberty is
much harsher than a loss of finances.  The criminal jus-
tice system can, through imposition or threat of jail time,
serve to curb individuals’ conduct to a much greater de-
gree than pecuniary punishment.
Scientific and technological advances in the way
we currently live our lives mandate that jurisdictions
should grant IIED the same criminal status that it grants
other criminalized intentional torts.  Words hurt.  The
law punishes those who inflict pain.  The punishment
should be meted out regardless of whether the pain orig-
inates through a physical force or through verbal or writ-
ten words.  
Criminalizing IIED provides the retributive
value of satiating those who are injured by others’
choice to bully, and it serves the deterrent value of warn-
ing others that the use of words, whether typed or
shouted, is intolerable and prevents words from escalat-
ing to a more serious physical harm.  There is a void in
our current criminalization scheme, left empty by the
failure to recognize that technology makes it easier to
harm and that a word can cause as much pain as a punch.
Criminalizing IIED would fill that void. 
Addendum
On January 5th, the BBC reported that members
of French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s ruling party pro-
posed a measure that would criminalize intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress.245 The proposed measure
would assess criminal penalties including jail time
against those who psychologically or verbally abuse
their spouse or live-in partner by insult, including re-
peated rude remarks about a partner’s appearance, false
allegations of infidelity, and threats of physical vio-
lence.246 The French parliament is expected to approve
the legislation in February. If passed, the law should be
in place six months later.  If passed, the bill would be
the first of its kind.247
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